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The global sustainability footprint of 
sovereign wealth funds
Hao Liang* and Luc Renneboog**
Abstract: With the emergence of  sovereign wealth funds (SWFs) around the world managing equity 
of  over $8 trillion, their impact on the corporate landscape and social welfare is being scrutinized. 
This study investigates whether and how SWFs incorporate environmental, social, and governance 
(ESG) considerations in their investment decisions in publicly listed corporations, as well as the sub-
sequent evolution of  target firms’ ESG performance. We find that SWF funds do consider the level 
of  past ESG performance as well as recent ESG score improvement when taking ownership stakes 
in listed companies. These results are driven by the SWF funds that do have an explicit or implicit 
ESG policy and are most transparent, and by SWF originating from developed countries and coun-
tries with civil law origins. In relation to engagement, we find by means of  two natural experiments 
with exogenous shocks (the Deepwater Horizon catastrophe and Volkwagen diesel scandal) that the 
ESG scores do not change significantly more for firms in which SWFs have ownership stakes. This 
potentially suggests that SWFs in general do not actively steer their target firms towards higher levels 
of  ESG.
Keywords: sovereign wealth funds, institutional ownership, corporate social responsibility, socially 
responsible investments, sustainability, shareholder engagement, ESG, environmental policy, social 
policy, corporate governance, exogeneous shock
JEL classification: G11, G18, G15, G28, Q01, M14
I. Introduction
Over the last 15 years and especially around the time of  the financial crisis, interest 
in and attention to the investment policies of  sovereign wealth funds (SWFs) have 
grown. According to the SWF Institute, global assets under management by SWFs 
have exceeded US$8 trillion, and the Norway Government Pension Fund Global 
manages over US$1 trillion of  wealth. While SWFs have been in existence for many 
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decades,1 they have attracted attention only in recent years, especially since the 
global financial crisis (Das, 2009). The purchase of  US$3 billion in equity in the 
Blackstone Group in 2007 by China Investment Corporation (CIC)—the SWF of 
China—sparked public interest (Bortolotti et al., 2009). Several Asian and Persian 
Gulf-based SWFs bought US$60 billion of  newly issued equity in large American 
and European banks in 2008, thereby playing a critical stabilizing role in the after-
math of  the crisis. Still, the lack of  transparency and political motivations led host 
country governments and firms to react cautiously to SWFs’ investments (Mezzacapo, 
2009). As SWFs are government-owned, they do not need to focus exclusively on fi-
nancial returns, but can also add a stakeholder perspective to their investment goals. 
Examples of  SWFs which explicitly have a corporate social responsibility (CSR) 
perspective include the Norwegian Oil fund, as well as the SWFs of  New Zealand 
and France (United Nations Environment Programme, 2017). It is challenging to 
investigate SWFs considering that many lack transparency and differ significantly in 
terms of  their purpose, geographical focus, and funding source, etc. (Bernstein et al., 
2009; Monk, 2011; Gangi et al., 2019).
Since the global financial crisis of  2007–8, more than 30 new SWFs have been 
established, such as the Turkey Wealth Fund in 2016 and the Japan Investment 
Corporation in 2018. Currently, SWFs are among the largest investors in the world, 
with Norway’s Government Pension Fund Global (or Norges Bank Investment 
Management) controlling more than US$1 trillion in assets under management 
(AUM) (SWF Institute, 2019).
Do SWFs, which typically aim at accumulating national wealth for the future 
generations thus have a long-term investment horizon without short-term liabilities 
(PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2016), with a stronger focus on stakeholder welfare rather 
than mere shareholder return orientation, compared to other institutional investors? 
Given their focus on the long term and immunity from pursuing short-term finan-
cial returns, it is reasonable to expect that SWFs may be in a prime position to focus 
on long-term corporate and societal sustainability by taking environmental, social, 
and governance (ESG) issues into account in their investment decisions. Such a 
stakeholder-orientation does not necessarily mean a sacrifice to shareholder returns, 
as a modest positive relation between socially responsible investing (SRI) and cor-
porate financial performance has on average been documented in academic research. 
However, aside from some case studies on specific funds, extensive research on the 
trade-off  between ESG-focus and pursuit of  financial returns by SWFs is still scarce.
This paper examines the relationship between SWFs’ investments and the ESG 
practice at the ownership stake level. We distinguish between SWFs’ selection (i.e. 
whether the ESG performance of  potential target firms affects SWF investment de-
cisions) and engagement (i.e. whether SWF investment affects the ESG performance 
of  target firms). To this end, we also distinguish between SWFs with an explicit 
ESG policy and those without. Specifically, we aim to answer the following research 
questions: (1) Do SWFs incorporate ESG considerations in their investment deci-
sions? (2) If  so, does the effect differ across types of  SWFs (e.g. by SWFs’ countries 
1 The first SWF was the French Caisse des Dépots et Consignations that was founded in 1816 (Hildebrand, 
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of  origin)? (3) Do SWFs also engage the target firm at the level of  CSR? In other 
words, do SWFs’ investment lead to an improvement of  the ESG performance of  the 
target firms?
Using a global sample of 24 SWFs (representing over 80 per cent of the total AUM 
by SWFs globally) that invest in 7,693 listed firms over the period of 2009 to 2018, 
we find that about half  of the SWFs with a high level of transparency formally dis-
close their ESG policies in their annual statements, which are related to higher value-
weighted ESG ratings of the public equity portion of their portfolio. At the portfolio 
company level, the ESG score of target firms is a strong predictor of its SWF ownership 
(both of the probability of being invested in and of the ownership stakes held). This 
relation holds not only for the aggregate ESG score but also for each component score. 
The ESG relation to SWF ownership is driven by SWFs originating from developed 
countries and civil law countries and by SWFs that explicitly adopt an ESG policy.
To disentangle the selection effect from the engagement effect, we exploit the 
occurrence of  some exogenous shocks (namely, the Deepwater Horizon oil spill ca-
tastrophe and the Volkwagen diesel scandal) which primarily influence the incentive 
to engage rather than the selection. We then conduct a difference-in-difference ana-
lysis around those events. We do not find evidence that SWF ownership increases 
the ESG performance of  the firms belonging to the industries concerned, even when 
we focus on the constituents of  the E, S, and G subscores. Therefore, our results 
show no evidence of  engagement of  SWFs in the ESG policy of  target firms, and 
instead suggest that SWFs seem to select companies with better ESG performance 
to invest.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: section II comprises the litera-
ture review on SWFs and corporate ESG issues. Sections III and IV discuss the data, 
the sample selection, and descriptive statistics, as well as the empirical methodology. 
Section V presents the results. Section VI concludes.
II. Sovereign wealth funds: types and purpose
(i) Definition, purpose, and proliferation of SWFs
Whereas SWFs have been in existence for many decades, the term ‘sovereign wealth 
fund’ was only recently coined to describe distinct investment entities, ‘neither trad-
itional public pension funds nor reserve assets supporting currencies, but a different 
type altogether’ (Rozanov, 2005). Formally, SWFs are special purpose investment 
funds or arrangements that are owned by the general government, usually cre-
ated from balance of  payments surpluses, official foreign currency operations, the 
proceeds of  privatizations, governmental transfer payments, fiscal surpluses, and/
or receipts resulting from resource exports (SWF Institute).2 SWFs are operated 
mostly for macroeconomic purposes by holding, managing, or administering assets 
2 In order to address issues with the proliferation of definitions and lack of regulation, The International 
Working Group (IWG) of Sovereign Wealth Funds gathered in October 2008 to adopt a set of ‘generally 
accepted principles and practices’ (GAPP) for SWFs; in short, the ‘Santiago Principles’. Their purpose is to 
identify a framework that properly reflects appropriate governance and accountability rules as well as the 
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to achieve financial objectives, and employ a set of  investment strategies that include 
investing in foreign financial assets. Das (2009) defines an SWF as a fund owned and 
run by the government of  a sovereign nation that manages national savings, budget 
surplus, and excess foreign exchange reserves by investing them globally into cor-
porate stocks and bonds and other financial instruments. Similarly, Gieve (2008) 
considers SWFs as government investment vehicles that manage foreign assets with 
a higher risk tolerance and higher expected return than for central bank foreign cur-
rency reserves.
According to the SWF Institute (February 2019), 78 large SWFs hold assets 
worth over US$8.1 trillion, which accounts for more than 10 per cent of  assets 
under management (AUM) worldwide. The SWF landscape is concentrated, as the 
top 10 SWFs own about two-thirds of  the total AUM by all SWFs, and the top 
20 funds hold 89 per cent. SWFs are holding shares in more than 20 per cent of 
the listed firms around the world (Fernandes, 2009), and they account not only 
for about 2 per cent of  the worldwide market capitalization but also of  the global 
bond markets (Gieve, 2008). According to the SWF Institute, the AUM of  SWFs 
has more than doubled since 2007. This strong growth has been fuelled by in-
creases in oil prices, financial globalization, and national budget surpluses. The 
SWF Institute expects the total AUM of  SWFs to reach US$13 trillion over the 
coming decade.
SWFs are usually created as a result of  national budget surpluses which have ac-
cumulated due to favourable economic conditions (Rozanov, 2005). In the case of 
resource-rich countries, the funds are recurrently replenished with revenues from com-
modities, primarily oil and gas, which are owned or taxed by the state (Rataj, 2018). 
Chambers et al. (2012) discuss several reasons for resource-rich countries to establish 
SWFs. First, founding an SWF can be a device for resource-rich countries to avoid that 
too high a distribution of  funds by a government would discourage of  citizens from 
working and developing their human capital. Second, a SWF can overcome the ‘Dutch 
disease’, a scenario in which a sudden increase in wealth (usually due to the discovery 
of  natural resources) triggers rapid inflation of  domestic prices and a stronger cur-
rency that decreases international competitiveness, resulting in de-industrialization. 
These reasons have been supported by the strong correlation between the number of 
new SWFs and the evolution of  oil prices (Amar, 2016). In Latin America, SWFs are 
often replenished by a positive trade balance due to exports even while countries are 
facing budget deficits, which signifies that those SWFs contain essentially ‘borrowed 
reserves’ (Das, 2009).
The main objectives of  SWFs include stabilizing government and export revenues, 
accumulating savings for future generations in resource-rich countries to offset the 
future lack of  natural resources, and/or to managing foreign reserves (Alhashel, 
2015). For example, the purpose of  the world’s largest and best performing SWF, the 
Norway Government Pension Fund-Global (NGPF-G), as stated in the Government 
Pension Fund Regulation, is to serve as ‘an instrument for ensuring that a reason-
able portion of  the country’s petroleum wealth benefits future generations’. More 
generally, Mohseni-Cheraghlou (2017) states that SWFs have as primary objective 
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account the additional objective of  long-term development and stability of  their 
own countries.3
(ii) Regulation and governance of SWFs
As SWFs are substantial state-owned entities actively investing in global assets, they 
create a friction between market capitalism and state capitalism. The former is con-
cerned with maximizing investment returns whereas state capitalism focuses on maxi-
mizing the value of a country’s economy as a whole (Gilson and Milhaupt, 2009). 
Expansionary investment policies and a lack of transparency give rise to suspicions 
about the motives behind their investments and their potential contribution to eco-
nomic, financial, or political disruption (Truman, 2017). To underline the need for 
greater transparency and accountability, Truman first published a ‘SWF scoreboard’ in 
2007 (which was updated in 2009, 2012, and 2016) to provide a benchmark to compare 
different funds. This scoreboard is based on 33 elements from four categories: structure, 
governance, accountability and transparency, and behaviour of the fund. The author 
argues that the international investment activities of governments have achieved a suf-
ficient scale and scope, and, as a result, an internationally agreed standard is needed 
to guide the management by governments of their cross-border investments (Truman, 
2007, 2009). The SWF scoreboards and the GAPP were intended to exert some pressure 
on the SWFs such that they increase their transparency and accountability (Truman, 
2017). While the GAPP cannot be legally enforced, most countries have regulations 
that can terminate SWF deals on the basis of a supposed threat to national security 
(Alhashel, 2015). For example, the US has regulatory constraints on SWFs’ investments 
to avoid not only controlling stakes but also to prevent them exercising significant influ-
ence over the US companies in their portfolio.
Gilson and Milhaupt (2009) notice the significant controversy around acquisitions of 
significant but non-controlling stakes by investors affiliated with foreign governments, 
and argue that regulation should attempt to reduce national industrial threats while not 
eliminating any benefits bestowed on the markets by having such players. They suggest 
3 Other guiding objectives identified by the IWG of SWFs (2008) to underpin the GAPP are: (i) to 
help maintain a stable global financial system and free flow of capital and investment; (ii) to comply with 
all applicable regulatory and disclosure requirements in the countries in which they invest; (iii) to invest on 
the basis of  economic and financial risk and return-related considerations; and (iv) to have in place a trans-
parent and sound governance structure that provides for adequate operational controls, risk management, 
and accountability. According to GAPP principle 2 (Appendix II), SWFs should clearly define and publicly 
disclose their policy purpose. In 2008, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) identified five categories 
of  SWFs based on their purposes: (i) stabilization funds; (ii) savings funds; (iii) reserve investment corpor-
ations; (iv) development funds; (v) contingent pension reserve funds. Petrova et al. (2011) recognized a shift 
in SWF’s asset allocations after the global financial crisis and revised the list of  the IMF to four categories: 
(i) macro stabilization; (ii) savings; (iii) reserve investments; (iv) pension reserves. The SWF Institute adds 
another category to the classification by Petrova et al. (2011): (v) strategic development sovereign wealth 
funds. The majority of  SWFs are either fiscal stabilization funds or savings funds for future generations. 
There are only a handful of  pension reserve funds and even fewer reserve investment corporations. Some 
SWFs have multiple objectives; development funds for instance do not have a primary commercial objective, 
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that the stakes acquired by SWFs should be non-voting, such that they do not have 
substantial control yet can still realize financial returns. Epstein and Rose (2009) argue 
against imposing any additional burden on investment by SWFs, as the result of en-
forcement of special restrictions on SWFs is that SWFs will redirect their investments 
to less restrictive markets. Therefore, a policy of watchful waiting is preferable over an 
immediate effort to impose special restrictions on SWFs. Rose (2008) identifies agency 
costs induced by SWFs’ passivity in that they decrease the overall shareholder moni-
toring of management. Also, Kratsas and Truby (2015) suggest that a limited form of 
regulation may be warranted to ease protectionist pressures and maintain consumer 
confidence.
To overcome the suspicion created by the friction between state capitalism and 
market capitalism in which SWFs operate, governance structures are vital. Monk (2011) 
concludes that SWFs match, mimic, or approximate the management structure and 
governance practices of Western institutional investors. Also, good governance is im-
portant for SWFs aiming at achieving a better performance, as government ownership 
is often associated with inferior performance compared to private ownership (Wang 
and Shailer, 2018). Ang (2010) uses four benchmarks to analyse SWF governance: (i) 
legitimacy (which is closely tied to transparency and accountability); (ii) integrated 
policy benchmark (which is tied to the government’s fiscal and other macro policies); 
(iii) governance structure and performance measures; and (iv) recognition of long-run 
externalities. Take NGPF-G, one of the largest and best performing SWFs worldwide, 
as an example. Truman (2010) ranks the NGPF-G the highest (97 per cent) in terms 
of structure, governance, and transparency on his SWF scoreboard. In relation to the 
fund’s transparency, Chambers et al. (2011) conclude that in order to earn support and 
public understanding, especially through financial downturns, the NGPF-G aims to 
be very transparent.4 On the topics of transparency and accountability, the NGPF-G 
obtained a score of 98 per cent in 2012 (Bagnall and Truman, 2013).
(iii) Value creation, investor behaviour, and strategies of SWFs
In terms of SWFs’ investing behaviour, Alhashel (2015) finds evidence supporting the 
notion that SWFs are mainly driven by economic motives (and not political ones), as 
they behave as economic entities maximizing their financial returns. Also, Epstein and 
Rose (2009) argue that SWFs act as model investors and are unlikely to invest oppor-
tunistically. Kratsas and Truby (2015) and Avendaño and Santiso (2009) find that SWF 
investment decisions do not differ greatly from those of other asset managers (e.g. mu-
tual funds), thus the fear of SWFs’ politically motivated investment decisions seems to 
be unfounded. Along this line, Knill et al. (2012) argue that SWFs prefer to invest in 
nations with which they have weaker political relations.
With regards to their investment strategies, SWFs tend to be opaque. Chhaochharia 
and Laeven (2009) show that SWFs largely invest to diversify away from the main 
4 For example, it provides much more information on strategy, investment philosophy, results, and risk 
than most SWFs and pension funds in jurisdiction. The Norges Bank publishes quarterly financial reports 
and an annual listing of all investments. External consultant reports and Strategy Council’s recommenda-
tions are published. Also, the ministry provides to parliament detailed annual reports including information 
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industries at home, but bias their investments toward financially constrained firms in 
countries that share the same culture. This suggests that the determinants of SWF in-
vestment strategies are not entirely driven by profit-maximizing objectives. Fotak et al. 
(2008) find evidence that SWFs almost always purchase minority stakes directly from 
target companies, of which roughly half  are unlisted and very frequently located in 
the SWF’s home country. In terms of country focus, Fernandes (2009) documents that 
SWFs invest mostly in large profitable firms with broad analyst coverage and located 
in countries with high investor protection and strong corporate governance. He also 
concludes that SWFs invest more than proportionally in countries with a higher degree 
of economic development, larger and more liquid financial markets, institutions that 
offer better protection of legal rights, and a more stable macroeconomic environment. 
Occasionally, SWFs seem to engage in ‘contrarian’ investment behaviour, i.e. increas-
ing their acquisitions in countries where crises hit. Kotter and Lel (2008) find a bias of 
SWF investments towards firms facing financial difficulties. In terms of sector prefer-
ence, Mohseni-Cheraghlou (2017) shows that the most popular sectors SWFs invest in 
are the financial and real estate sectors because of their greater liquidity, and the energy 
sector for its strategic importance.
Existing studies also find conflicting evidence on whether SWFs play a passive 
or active role in target firms. According to Rose (2008), Kotter and Lel (2008), and 
Ghahramani (2013), most SWFs appear to be passive investors. This may also result 
from the fact that many countries have adopted regulations that prevent foreign invest-
ment funds from acquiring controlling stakes in domestic firms. However, Mehrpouya 
et al. (2009), Dewenter et al. (2010), Alhashel (2015), and Mehrpouya (2015) find that 
SWFs seem to behave increasingly more as active investors. SWFs’ activism is described 
as ‘defensive’ activism, namely, actively monitoring the target firm, not seeking ways to 
force value-creating changes, but preventing losses from mismanagement (Rose, 2014).
The long-run performance of SWFs’ equity investments tends to be poor due to 
imperfect portfolio diversification and poor corporate governance (Chhaochharia and 
Laeven, 2009). Bortolotti et al. (2015) show that the announcement-period abnormal 
returns of SWFs equity investments in publicly traded firms are positive, but the reac-
tion is weaker than for comparable stock purchases by private investors. Additionally, 
they find that targets suffer from declining return on assets (ROA) and sales growth 
over the subsequent 3 years. Knill et al. (2011) also find a positive short-term effect 
on target firms’ returns, but a negative 1-year effect following SWF acquisitions. SWF 
investment is believed to reduce risk, but the reduction is still not sufficiently large to 
justify the lower return. Other studies supporting the positive short-term response to 
SWF investment are by Kotter and Lel (2008) and Dewenter et al. (2010), who show 
that the announcement cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) are higher when the SWF 
investor is more transparent.
Fernandes (2014) reports that companies experience increases in value both at the 
time of and after large investments by SWFs by showing a highly significant improve-
ment of operating performance (return on equity (ROE), ROA, and earnings before 
interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization (EBITDA)-to-assets ratio) for companies 
receiving large SWF investments. It is suggested that the channels towards this superior 
performance are higher levels of CEO turnover in target firms, increased ability to raise 
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(iv) Relationship between SWFs and CSR
By nature, SWFs act as long-term investors with the aim of leaving a legacy and safe-
guarding national wealth for future generations. Therefore, it is reasonable to expect that 
SWFs’ investment policy is geared towards more responsible firms which have de facto 
policies aiming at sustainability. Due to their size and significant market power, SWFs 
have the potential to catalyse change with regard to eliminating pollution, improving 
working conditions, pursuing gender equality, and reducing corruption.
In addition, responsible and sustainable investing has been increasingly becoming 
part of the societal preferences, and by investing the state’s assets, SWFs need to re-
spond to societal demand. The Public Funds Investment Policy Survey of Mullen and 
Rose (2018), covering the policies of the 26 largest SWFs, discloses that 15 per cent of 
the SWFs are subject to ESG restrictions prohibiting the fund from unethical invest-
ing; 8 per cent take into account ESG in their investment policy; and 15 per cent face 
asset class restrictions. In addition, 58 per cent disclose a code of ethics to ensure that 
investments are made in accordance with the fund’s policies and any other relevant 
regulations.
Moreover, with regard to the relationship between CSR and corporate financial 
performance, Gerard (2018) reviews the CSR literature and formulates a general con-
sensus that ESG has a positive impact on equity and bond performance. Stronger CSR 
leads to higher corporate value, higher equity returns, and lower risk. However, due to 
increasing ESG awareness, the performance edge of CSR investments has largely dis-
appeared as broader awareness of the importance of ESG concerns is recognized in the 
stock prices, such that a portfolio strategy to reach consistently superior returns may 
be precluded. The positive correlation between ESG and corporate financial perform-
ance is supported by Friede et al. (2015) who examine ESG and corporate financial 
performance across over 2,000 academic studies since 1970. Of reviewed studies, 62.6 
per cent indicate a positive correlation between ESG factors and financial performance, 
whereas only 10 per cent display a negative relationship. Another meta-study by Clark 
et al. (2015) concludes that 80 per cent of the 200 academic studies categorized reveal 
that prudent sustainability practices have a positive influence on investment perform-
ance, 90 per cent of the studies on the cost of capital show that sound sustainability 
standards lower firms’ cost of capital, and 88 per cent disclose that solid ESG practices 
result in better operational performance. Additionally, some find that active ownership 
enables investors to influence corporate behaviour and benefit from improvements in 
sustainable business practices (Barko et al., 2018).
From an investor perspective, investing in high ESG portfolios usually does not yield 
superior expected returns. For instance, Renneboog et al. (2008) find that socially re-
sponsible investments (SRI) funds underperform their domestic benchmarks by –2.2 
per cent to –6.5 per cent, but in terms of risk-adjusted returns most SRI funds’ per-
formance is not statistically different from that of conventional funds. They do not 
find evidence of a ‘smart money’ effect driving the results, as SRI investors are unable 
to identify the funds that will outperform in the future. Similarly, the meta-study by 
Friede et al. (2015) concludes that portfolio studies, comprising those on mutual funds, 
indices, and long/short portfolios, exhibit a weaker relation between ESG and financial 
performance in comparison to firm-level studies. Possible explanations are that many 
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array of value-driven and profit-seeking investors. As a result, intensive screening limits 
the investment universe of SRI funds, and the fact that SWFs may try to unify different 
ESG perspectives may come at a cost. Moreover, it is shown that active fund manage-
ment is costly in terms of fees which may wipe out a possible ESG alpha.
Overall, SWFs may have multiple incentives to care about their portfolio companies’ 
ESG practices. First, as SWFs are long-term investors aiming to create and safeguard 
an inheritance for future generations. Second, responsible investing has increasingly 
become part of the societal preferences. Third, research shows that ESG is positively 
related to corporate financial performance and SWFs may try to exploit this using an 
ESG-based strategy. In the next sections, we formally test the relationship between 
SWF ownership and portfolio companies’ ESG performance.
III. Data
(i) Sample and variable description
We adopt a definition of SWF that contains the core characteristics included in the 
plethora of definitions, namely that SWFs are investment vehicles run by governments, 
invest globally, and do not have explicit pension liabilities (Capapé and Guerrero 
Blanco, 2013). Specifically, SWFs are more specifically defined as: (i) investment funds 
rather than operating companies; (ii) entities wholly owned by a sovereign government, 
yet organized separately from a central bank or ministry of finance; (iii) funds making 
both international and domestic investment in different risky assets; (iv) funds with the 
pursuit of a commercial return as their main objective; and (v) wealth funds rather than 
pension funds, in the sense that the proceeds do not stem from pensioners’ contribu-
tions and that these have hence no liabilities to individual citizens. This definition yields 
a list of 140 funds (see Table 1). However, many funds are opaque and do not provide 
any data on their holdings. Our primary data source for SWF investments is FactSet, 
in which we only find holdings data for a sample of 24 SWFs. The 24 retained SWFs as 
shown in Table 1 represent 83.75 per cent of the total AUM by SWFs globally, and have 
invested in 7,693 listed firms over the period from 2009 until 2018.
In Table 1, we also show each fund’s inception year, region of origination, origin 
of the funding (i.e. commodity or non-commodity; Boubakri et al., 2013, 2016), size 
(AUM as collected from the Sovereign Wealth Fund Institute, the fund’s website, or 
its annual report), legal origin of the home country (La Porta et al., 2008), level of 
economic development of the home country (developed, emerging, frontier economy), 
the transparency score (Stone and Truman, 2016), and the presence of a CSR policy. 
To identify the presence of an ESG policy, we analyse annual reports and web pages 
of SWFs on statements about responsible investing objectives (environmental, social, 
and governance issues) and search for key words such as ‘responsible’, ‘sustainability’, 
‘ethics’, ‘ESG’, ‘CSR’, etc.
The total AUM of all SWFs identified in the list in Table 1 amounts to US$8,484 bil-
lion and the subsample of 24 SWFs for US$7,105 billion. Figure 1 shows that, geograph-
ically, SWFs are most prominent in the Middle East (many of which are oil-exporting 
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half  of the SWFs come from emerging countries and only a small number are from 
‘frontier countries’ (based on SWF Institute’s classification; see Figure 2 and Table 1). 
Figure 3 shows the legal origin of the sample SWFs: SWFs primarily originate from 
English common law countries and the SWFs originating from socialist law countries 
are all from China. About 40 per cent of the SWFs source their funds from the govern-
ment’s sales of commodity resources (Figure 4). Only about one-third of SWFs are 
highly transparent according to Truman’s transparency scores (Figure 5).
The coverage of the holding (ownership) data of the SWFs prior to 2009 is not com-
plete and many of the target firms do not have an ESG score5 (collected from Thomson 
Reuters’ Asset4 ESG ratings) at that time. For this reason, our sample period spans the 
period from 2009 to 2018 (nevertheless, we also show results for the full sample period 
of 2004–18 for robustness). Availability of equity ownership data for the 24 SWFs leads 
to a sample of 7,784 target firms. When we restrict the sample to all firm-years for 
which ESG scores are available in Asset4, we retain 30,879 firm-year observations. For 
25,507 firm-years (or 82.6 per cent), SWF ownership can be collected. FactSet’s source 
for ownership of US and Canadian traded equities are mandatory quarterly 13F fil-
ings with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). For non-North American 
equities, institutional ownership is collected from national regulatory agencies, stock 
exchange announcements, company proxies, or annual reports.
It is important to note that although SWFs invest in multiple asset classes, we only 
analyse their positions in public equity (investments in listed companies) because price 
and ESG information on their other investments such as private equity, bonds, real 
estates, or commodities is usually not available. The ownership data enable us to con-
struct the listed equity portfolio of SWFs and study the role of their presence in the 
ownership structure of target firms.
(ii) Control variables
When studying the determinants of an SWF investment decision in a target firm, we 
also consider a set of control variables. First, as Chhaochharia and Laeven (2009), 
Kotter and Lel (2008), and Fernandes (2009) document that SWFs prefer to invest in 
large organizations, we take the logarithm of market capitalization (log MCAP) of 
a portfolio company as a proxy for firm size. Second, firm performance is measured 
by return on assets (ROA), sales growth (Sales Growth), annual stock returns (Annual 
Return), and the market-to-book ratio of equity (Market to Book ratio). In addition 
to a firm’s financial performance, we also control for operational efficiency (Operating 
5 The score ranges from 0 to 100 and comprises three pillars (E, S, and G), each counting for about 
one-third. The environmental pillar is based on subscores related to resource use, emissions, environmental 
innovation; the social pillar concentrates on workforce, human rights, community orientation, and product 
responsibility; the governance pillar evaluates management quality, shareholder involvement, and CSR 
strategy. Additionally, firms are penalized when involved in a scandal captured by means of 23 ESG con-
troversy topics. The data are processed by over 150 content research analysts and incorporate over 400 ESG 
metrics for 178 critical ESG measures in the ESG scoring, based upon more than 400 data points, ratios, and 
analytics. The ESG data are retrieved from company reports covering over 7,000 public companies globally, 
which in most cases disclose ESG information on a yearly basis. Out of the 7,000 firms that are assigned an 
ESG score, approximately 2,300 firms are located in North America, 1,200 in Europe, 970 in Asia (excluding 
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Figure 3: Legal origin of SWFs in sample by number of SWFs
Figure 1: Regions of sample SWFs (number of SWFs)






/oxrep/article/36/2/380/5813055 by guest on 16 M
arch 2021
The global sustainability footprint of sovereign wealth funds 401














/oxrep/article/36/2/380/5813055 by guest on 16 M
arch 2021
Hao Liang and Luc Renneboog402
Margin) which captures how much profit a company generates from a dollar of sales, 
the value of sales relative to assets (Asset Turnover ratio), the goodwill to assets ratio 
(Goodwill to Assets ratio) which captures the know-how and uniqueness of the target 
firm (Kotter and Lel, 2011), and the capital expenditure to sales ratio (Capex to Sales 
ratio) is used as a proxy for the target firm’s investment intensity. We also control for 
dividend yield (Div Yield) to proxy for payout policy of target firms, the capital struc-
ture (Leverage), the ratio of cash to total assets (Cash Assets ratio), and the fixed charge 
coverage ratio (Fixed Charge Coverage ratio) that measures the ability to pay all fixed 
charges or expenses by means of the EBIT.
(iii) Descriptive statistics
The summary statistics of SWFs’ holdings (ownership in target firms) are displayed in 
Table 2. The statistics show that the number of firms in the sample in which SWFs have 
an ownership stake increases significantly during our sample period, from 4,872 (63.33 
per cent) in 2009 to 7,209 (93.71 per cent) in 2018. Also, the average ownership stake 
SWFs have in their target firms increases throughout the sample period, from 1.18 per 
cent in 2009 to 2.07 per cent in 2018. Additionally, the number of firms of which SWFs 
hold 1 per cent or more of the ownership increases rapidly, from 1,206 (15.68 per cent) 
firms in 2009 to 4,739 (61.60 per cent) firms in 2018. The total number of firm-year ob-
servations in the sample in which SWFs have 1 per cent or more ownership in the firm 
amounts to 32.60 per cent of the firm-years. However, this amount rapidly decreases 
when the ownership threshold increases. For example, the firm-year observations in 
the sample in which SWFs have a stake of 5 per cent or more ownership in the target 
firm is only 3.57 per cent and a stake of 10 per cent or more only accounts for 1.50 per 
cent of the total observations. Overall, we can state that SWF ownership during the 
period from 2009 to 2018 rapidly increased in many of the firms included in the sample, 
through either buying new firms or buying more shares in the companies already in-
cluded in their portfolios. The descriptive statistics of the dependent and independent 
variables are presented in Table 3.



















2009 7,693 4,872 63.3303 1,206 15.6766 1.182
2010 7,693 5,238 68.0879 1,721 22.3710 1.524
2011 7,693 4,949 64.3312 1,381 17.9514 1.165
2012 7,693 5,113 66.4630 1,526 19.8362 1.298
2013 7,693 5,105 66.3590 1,754 22.7999 1.474
2014 7,693 5,413 70.3627 2,351 30.5602 1.654
2015 7,693 5,747 74.7043 2,803 36.4357 1.695
2016 7,693 6,154 79.9948 3,338 43.3901 1.737
2017 7,693 6,821 88.6650 4,170 54.2051 1.874
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(iv) Methodology
Our unit of empirical analysis is at the holding level, i.e. a firm that receives an SWF in-
vestment. We first test the relation between the level of investment by an SWF (i.e. SWF 
ownership) in a target firm and the firm’s (change in) ESG performance. As the level 
of investment by SWF in a portfolio company is conditional on the SWF’s decision to 
invest in the company in the first place (i.e. a SWF first decides to invest in a company, 
then decides how much to invest in the company), there may be a potential selection 
bias if  we directly regress firm-level ESG ratings on firm-level SWF ownership. In order 
to take into account such potential selection bias, we first estimate a Heckman selection 
model. This is essentially a two-stage model, with the first stage testing the determin-
ants of whether to invest in a firm or not (i.e. a selection model, which is a probit regres-
sion with the dependent variable as a dummy capturing whether or not the SWF takes a 
stake in the target), and the second stage testing how much the SWF invests in the firm 
in terms of ownership stakes (with the dependent variable being a continuous variable 
capturing the percentage SWF ownership stakes).6 The models are firm-level random 
effects in combination with year and sector fixed-effects and standard errors are clus-
tered at the firm level. The independent variables include the level ESG score of target 
firms and the changes in ESG performance, in addition to a set of control variables, all 
of which are lagged by 1 year. The estimated equations are shown as follows, whereby 
the definitions of the variables are given in Appendix I:
%/Dum SWF Ownershipi,t =α+ β1aESG scorei,t−2 + β1bChange in ESG scorei,(t−2,t−1)
+β2 log (MCAP)i,t−1 + β3ROAi,t−1 + β4Sales Growthi,t−1
+β5Annual Returni,t−1 + β6Market to Book ratioi,t−1
+β7Operating Margin ratioi,t−1 + β8Asset Turnover ratioi,t−1
+β9Goodwill to Assets ratioi,t−1 + β10Capex to Sales ratioi,t−1
+β11Div Yieldi,t−1 + β12Leveragei,t−1
+β13Cash Assets ratioi,t−1
+β14Fixed Charge Coverage rationi,t−1 + εi,t (1)
In addition, we also test whether SWFs put a higher emphasis on one particular ESG 
pillar relative to the others, by replacing the general ESG score in Equation (1) by the 
environment, social, and corporate governance subscores respectively in multivariate 
panel models.
While the above equations focus on selection, i.e. whether a fund selects target firms 
based on firms’ ESG performance, it may be that the ESG scores are affected by the 
existing SWF ownership, which would be an engagement effect. The selection versus 
engagement effects boil down to an endogeneity issue to which our models may be 
liable and which would prevent causal claims. In order to address this issue, we use 
exogenous events leading to a shock in ESG score. We use a difference-in-difference 
method based on two major global ESG shocks, namely the Deepwater Horizon oil 
spill in April 2010 and the Volkswagen emissions scandal in September 2015. In the 
6 We also conduct a set of robustness tests using probit models with dummies taking the value of 1 if  
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difference-in-difference regressions, we use 15 ESG subscores from Asset4, which are 
more granular measures of a firm’s ESG performance, because these measures (such as 
product safety indicators) are more sensitive to the above shocks. We study the effect of 
the shocks on a sample of publicly listed firms active in the above-mentioned industries 
and with a market capitalization of at least US$500m. Additional firms that do not 
have SWF ownership and fit the sample criteria are added to the database to form the 
control group. The key variable of interest is the interaction between an event dummy 
and an SWF ownership dummy.
IV. Results
(i) ESG statements by SWFs
In order to gain the first insights on the relationship between SWFs and ESG, we study 
SWF statements concerning ESG investment policies of the SWFs managing more 
than US$100 billion (which represents 15 SWFs owning 96.42 per cent of all AUM 
covered in our sample). The websites, and if  available annual reports and ESG reports 
of the SWFs, are analysed by searching for keywords such as: ‘responsible,’ ‘sustain-
ability,’ ‘ethics,’ ‘ESG,’ ‘CSR,’ etc. Subsequently, we also examine the statements of each 
SWF using a similar approach based on these keywords. Seven out of the 15 analysed 
SWFs disclose the use of ESG metrics in their investment decision process. In terms 
of ethical investing, the NGPF-G is considered a pioneer as it not only selects target 
firms that meet its ethical guidelines, but also explicitly claims to exercise its owner-
ship rights to engage with target firms in order to improve their ESG policy. Also, the 
South-African PIC has an extensive ESG policy and aims at meeting its investment 
objectives while investing for sustainable growth, inclusivity, and transformation. PIC 
uses ESG metrics to measure investee companies’ ESG compliance and identify areas 
for engagement. It engages in target firms’ ESG issues through shareholder activism 
via proxy-voting. The NZSF has a stated climate change strategy factoring in the risks 
and opportunities stemming from climate change in its investment strategies and own-
ership practices. Besides these three SWFs, we also discovered that the HKMA, GIC, 
TH, KIC, and AFF explicitly state that they incorporate ESG measures in their invest-
ment decision process. A common belief  among the SWFs with an ESG policy is that 
effective management of ESG risks and opportunities supports return maximization. 
CIC does not state a specific ESG policy, but mentions respect for local social norms 
and public opinion. SAMA is active in social projects supporting education and re-
search on autism.
We calculate the value-weighted ESG score per SWF per year based on target firms’ 
ESG ratings, the market value of the ownership stake an SWF has in a target firm, and 
the market value of its portfolio in a specific year. We show the value-weighted ESG 
scores of the NGPF-G, GIC, PIC, NZSF, KIA, PSF, and KIC in Table 4. On average, the 
SWFs have a value-weighted ESG score of 48, which is slightly higher than the average 
ESG score of the sample (by almost 2 points). The average value-weighted ESG score 
of all SWFs combined per year varies between 45 in 2009 and 53.55 in 2016. Overall, 
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statements concerning CSR on websites and reports. The NZSF, PIC, and NGPF-G 
have a relatively high ESG score of 50 or above. In spite of their explicit ESG statements, 
PSF and KIC have lower weighted-average ESG scores than the sample average.
(ii) Multivariate results
Selection of target firms
In the Heckman selection models of Panel A  of Table  5, the dummy variable SWF 
ownership (with 1 representing an investment in a target firm and 0 otherwise) is the de-
pendent variable of the first-stage probit regression, and the percentage SWF ownership, 
a continuous variable, is the dependent variable of the second-stage OLS regression. 
Columns (1) and (2) show the first- and second-stage results from the Heckman model 
estimation for the full sample (from 2004 to 2018), and Columns (3) and (4) show the re-
sults from the same test on the subsample covering the post-crisis period (2009–18). The 
independent variable of interest is the lagged ESG score, which in almost all regressions 
has a positive coefficient that is significant at the 1 per cent level for both stages across 
columns (1)–(4). This indicates that firms with higher ESG ratings are more often a target 
firm of an SWF, and SWFs take larger ownership stakes in those firms. The insignificant 
inverse Mill’s ratio indicates that there may not be a selection bias as the error terms of 
both equations are not significantly correlated. Columns (5)–(8) of Panel A also show re-
sults from (probit) random effects models explaining SWF investments above the 0.5, 1, 
and 2 per cent ownership levels in target firms and confirm that better ESG performance 
is associated with higher likelihood of SWFs making such investments.
In Panel B, we explore the cross-country variations in the effects reported in Panel 
A. We note that a firm’s ESG score is positively and significantly correlated with its 
SWF ownership in both stages of the Heckman model if  the SWF is from a developed 
economy, whereas it is only significant in the second-stage for SWFs from emerging 
economies, and only significant in the first-stage for SWFs from frontier economies. 
Focusing on the legal origin and disentangling SWFs originating from common- and 
civil-law countries, we find that the ESG score of a firm is positively and significantly 
correlated with SWF ownership in both stages of the Heckman model and the param-
eter estimates are similar in models (7)/(8) and (9)/(10). In Panel C, we compare the 
results for SWFs that have an explicit ESG policy (columns (1)–(2)) with those without 
ESG statements (columns (3)–(4)). As expected, we find that the ESG score has a much 
stronger correlation with the SWF’s decision to invest and the ownership stakes for 
the SWFs with an explicit ESG policy. In other words, SWFs seem to put their money 
where their mouth is. The relation between firm ESG performance and SWF invest-
ment is also strong for transparent SWFs (columns (5)–(6)). We also perform a few 
robustness tests whereby we exclude the NGPF-G and PIC SWFs from the sample as 
these two funds have explicit ESG focus in their investment policies and represent a 
vast part of the firm-year observations. We note that in columns (7)–(8), as expected, 
the elimination of these funds reduces the relation between ESG and SWF ownership, 
but ESG still predicts the likelihood of a firm being targeted by SWF (i.e. significance 
in the first stage). Focusing solely on the ownership data of the NGPF-G, the ESG ac-
tivist Norwegian fund (columns (9) and (10)), we observe a significant positive effect in 
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Table 6 (Panel A) exhibits the multivariate panel regression results with percentage 
SWF ownership as the dependent variable and both the absolute ESG score (i.e. the 
level of ESG) and the change of ESG score from t–2 to t–1 as explanatory variables for 
different sample periods. The first two models in columns (1) and (2) point out that not 
only the levels of ESG (measured at t–2) but also the subsequent changes in ESG affect 
the SWFs’ investment decision and the size of the investment. The probit random effects 
models in columns (3)–(5) show that changes in ESG lead to a significant increase in in-
vestments of more than 1 per cent (of the equity) in target firms. In Panel B, we find that 
it is mainly the SWFs from developed countries (column (1)) that invest in firms with 
high ESG scores and respond to ESG performance increases. This is not the case for 
SWFs from emerging or frontier countries (columns (2)–(3)). The coefficients of lagged 
level ESG score and lagged changes in ESG score of civil law SWFs are positive and 
significant, but those for SWFs from common law countries are not. This is in line with 
Liang and Renneboog (2017) who show that firms in civil-law countries are more sensi-
tive to ESG issues. Expectedly, when comparing SWFs with and without an ESG policy, 
the former respond more strongly to both levels and changes in firms’ ESG. Panel C of 
Table 6 confirms the results of Table 5.7
Engagement with target firms
While the above analysis focuses on selection (i.e. how a firm’s ESG performance affects 
its SWF’s decision to invest in it), we also examine the effects of SWF engagement as it 
may be that an SWF investment affects the ESG policy of firms which will then be re-
flected in the ESG scores. To do so, ideally, we would have a setting which exogenously 
intensifies the costs or benefits of ESG in the portfolio company to existing investors, 
but does not directly drive their decision to invest in or divest the company. As most 
SWFs invest in the market index, whereas the ESG scores are also given to companies 
on major equity indices (i.e. public companies with large market capitalization), com-
pletely divesting companies from their portfolios is not usually feasible. As a result, the 
change in the correlation between SWF ownership and its portfolio companies’ ESG 
scores following an exogenous ‘shock’ mostly reflects whether the SWF actively engages 
with target companies. Therefore, we employ a difference-in-difference analysis exploiting 
some exogenous shocks to ESG issues. We focus on two major environmental shocks: the 
Deepwater Horizon oil spill and the Volkswagen emissions scandal. The former refers to 
the BP oil platform that exploded in the Gulf of Mexico, and created a shockwave in the 
oil and gas extraction and petroleum refining industries. The latter refers to the disclosure 
that Volkswagen had installed devices in its diesel engines to manipulate test results in 
order to cheat in the emissions tests in the US, leading to a shock in the motor vehicles 
and passenger car bodies industry. We use detailed ESG measures (the components of 
the general ESG score), which are expected to capture aspects that are most affected by 
7 When we repeat the analysis in Tables 5 and 6, replacing the total ESG score by the environmental, 
social, and corporate governance subcomponent scores, we find that the lagged ESG subscore coefficients are 
all positive and statistically significant, which suggests that SWFs invest primarily in firms with higher levels 
of E, S, and G practice, but that there is no bias towards specific E, S, and G pillars. The results for the ESG 
subscores are also upheld when we use different sample periods (2004–18 or 2009–18) and different SWF 
ownership dummies (0.5%, 1%, 2%). The E, S, and G pillar scores are also significant and positive for SWFs 
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the shock, as dependent variables in the difference-in-difference regressions. We estimate 
the difference-in-difference regressions for different SWF ownership (holding a stake of 
any size, or stakes of minimal levels at, for example, 0.5 per cent) for different samples 
(all SWFs, or only the most prominent SWFs in terms of CSR commitment and size 
such as NGPF-G and NZSF). We are primarily interested in the interaction term Dum 
SWF × Post-Year that captures the difference in the average change in the ESG measures 
from before to after the event for firms with SWF ownership relative to firms without 
SWF ownership. The dummy SWF ownership estimates the mean difference in the ESG 
measure between firms with and without SWF ownership prior to the event. The event 
dummy estimates the average change in the more granular ESG measures before and after 
the event for the firms without SWF ownership. Engagement of SWFs in ESG policies 
of target firms can be assumed when the interaction dummy is significant and positive.
Panel A of Table 7 exhibits the results from analysing the Deepwater Horizon shock 
for the whole sample of all SWFs. We use a range of subcomponent ESG variables cap-
turing different aspects of a firm’s ESG engagement from the Asset4 database. These 
variables include management commitment towards best practice corporate governance 
principles (CGSR as named in the Asset4 database), effectiveness of a firm’s processes 
geared towards long-term shareholder value (CGVS), measures proportionate man-
agement compensation (CGCP), principles related to a well-balanced membership of 
the board (‘CGBS’), the presence of board committees (CGBF), effectiveness towards 
creating value-added products and services upholding the customer’s security (SOPR), 
reputation protecting public health and respecting business ethics (SOCO), guaranteeing 
the freedom of association and excluding child, forced, or compulsory labour (SOHR), 
maintenance of diversity and equal opportunities in the workforce (SODO), provision of 
high-quality employment benefits and job conditions (SOEQ), commitment to healthy 
and safe workplace (SOHS), investment in training and development for the workforce 
(SOTD), effectiveness towards reducing environmental emission (ENER), R&D invest-
ment in eco-efficient products or services (ENPI), and the efficient use of natural re-
sources in the production process (ENRR) (more detailed definitions are provided in the 
Appendix III with variable definitions). The Deepwater Horizon shock mostly concerns 
environmental issues, and other ESG variables (such as those measuring social and gov-
ernance issues) are included as placebo tests for comparison.
First, we note that the event has a strong, significant, and lasting impact on most of 
the subcomponent ESG variables. Second, however, we observe that none of the inter-
action terms between an SWF ownership stake and the period subsequent to the shock 
is significant for different subcomponent ESG scores as any of the dependent variables, 
which implies that firms with an SWF investment and belonging to the sector of the oil 
and gas extraction and petroleum refining do not change their ESG policies relatively 
more than firms without such a stake and being part of the same industry. When we limit 
the sample to the Norwegian (NGPF-G) and New Zealand (NZSW) SWFs, the results 
do not differ (Panel B). The interaction term is not significant either when we limit the 
impact period to the years 2010 and 2011 (when the event happened), nor when we test 
the impact of larger SWF stakes (a holding of 0.5 per cent of the equity or larger).
The difference-in-differences results for the Volkswagen shock, as shown in Table 8, 
also yield an insignificant effect of the interaction dummy for companies in the industry 
of motor vehicles and passenger cars. In line with the analysis of the Deepwater Horizon 
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is significant, which shows that the shock has a significant impact on the industry but 
the SWF ownership does not lead firms to change their ESG policy more. Various tests 
on the impact period, the SWF sample, and the size of the SWF ownership do not yield 
different results.
Overall, results from these tests suggest that there is no strong evidence that SWF 
engagement affects the ESG policy of target firms. In other words, the positive correl-
ation between a firm’s ESG rating and its ownership held by an SWF is more likely to 
be driven by the preference of SWFs in selecting high ESG companies to invest, rather 
than actively improving the company’s ESG performance.
V. Conclusions
This study investigates the relationship between SWFs and their portfolio companies’ 
ESG scores. One striking initial observation is that SWFs are quite heterogeneous with 
regard to their size, organizational structure, funding sources, legal status, investment 
policies, number of equity investments, and size of average equity investment. Also, the 
vast majority of the SWFs lack transparency and hardly disclose any information with 
regard to their operations and ESG policies.
In order to gain some insight into how SWFs leave sustainability footprints across 
the world, partially through their investment in public equity, we collect statements 
concerning SWFs’ ESG policy from their websites and reports. About half  of the 
SWFs with a high level of transparency disclose statements on their ESG policies. The 
Norwegian SWF (NGPF-G) and the Public Investment Corporation (PIC) of South 
Africa state that they not only include ESG as a determinant to select target firms 
but also actively engage with firms within their investment portfolio to improve their 
ESG policies. These funds do, indeed, have a higher value-weighted ESG score than the 
SWFs without an explicit ESG policy.
The results from the Heckman selection models (as well as probit panel regressions) 
provide further evidence that SWFs take the ESG performance of target firms into 
account in their investment decision process. The positive relationship between SWF 
ownership and ESG scores of target firms is in line with the existing literature, sug-
gesting that the objective of SWFs is to maximize financial returns and minimize risk 
and losses while taking into account long-term development and stability (Mohseni-
Cheraghlou, 2017). Friede et al. (2015), Clark et al. (2015), Ferrell et al. (2016), and 
Gerard (2018) support that taking ESG scores into account as an investment deter-
minant is positively related to corporate financial performance.
Delving one level deeper into the E, S, and G subscores, we find that SWFs do not 
focus on one particular subfield of corporate responsibility and sustainability, but each 
of the three ESG pillars is an important investment determinant of SWFs. The ESG re-
lation to SWF ownership is driven by SWFs originating from developed countries and 
civil law countries and by SWFs that explicitly adopt an ESG policy. This is consistent 
with studies as Aggarwal and Goodell (2018) and Aizenman and Glick (2009), finding 
that national culture, norms, and governance have a significant impact on SWF govern-
ance. Additionally, Liang and Renneboog (2017) show that a firm’s CSR rating and its 
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While we have found that ESG is a selection criterion in SWFs’ investment decisions, 
we also study whether SWF engagement leads to changes in the ESG performance of 
target firms. For this reason, we exploit the occurrence of some exogenous shocks in 
difference-in-differences regressions. We do not find evidence that SWF ownership in-
creases the ESG performance of the firms belonging to the industries concerned, even 
when we focus on the constituents of the E, S, and G subscores. So, our results show no 
evidence of engagement of SWFs towards improving the ESG performance of target 
firms. This is in line with the findings of Alhashel (2015) and Rose (2014), stating that 
SWFs primarily behave passively and monitor target firms, not to seek ways to force 
value-creating changes, but to prevent losses from mismanagement. Also, the survey by 
Mullen and Rose (2018) indicates that SWFs use ESG scores as a selection criterion to 
include or exclude target firms in their portfolio, but do not actively engage in target 
firms in order to improve their ESG policy.
With regard to the generalizability of our results, we would like to point out a few 
caveats. Due to a lack of transparency by the bulk of SWFs, the analysis is limited to 
only 24 funds (although these funds stand for more than 80 per cent of the total AUM 
of SWFs). In addition, even for the most transparent SWFs, we can only study SWFs’ 
equity investments and not the investments in other asset classes (such as private equity, 
bond investments, real estate, etc.) which are not disclosed and most of which do not 
have an ESG rating. It should also be noted that the results are driven by some dom-
inant funds. For example, the NGPF-G accounts for 62.40 per cent of the AUM of our 
sample. Another limitation in this research is that the execution of an event study to 
test for engagement of SWFs is not possible as the exact dates of the SWF investment 
and ESG rating are not available in the databases employed. Nevertheless, our findings 
highlight how SWFs, being among the most important global institutional investors, 
leave their ESG footprints across the world.
Appendix I: Variable definitions
This table presents the definitions of main and control variables.
Main variables  
SWF ownership % ownership stake SWFs have of a target firm
ESG ESG score of target firm
Delta ESG Difference in ESG score compared to ESG score of the previous year.
Control variables  
Annual return Return calculated using the current adjusted price and the adjusted price 1 year 
ago. Displayed as a percentage.
Log(market value) Logarithm of market value in millions.
Dividend yield The ratio of a company’s annual dividend divided by its share price. Displayed as a 
percentage.
Leverage Leverage ratio, calculated by dividing a firm’s debt by the firm’s equity. Displayed as 
a percentage.
Sales growth Annual growth in sales. Displayed as a percentage.
Cash assets ratio Cash and cash equivalents divided by total assets. Displayed as a percentage.
ROA Calculated by dividing a company’s annual earnings by its total assets. Displayed 
as a percentage. 
Operating income Annual sales minus total operating expenses.
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CAPEX Capital expenditures on the balance sheet of a company
Total assets Total assets represent the sum of total current assets, long-term receivables, 
investment in unconsolidated subsidiaries, other investments, net property plant and 
equipment and other assets.
Market to book ratio Market to book ratio of firm, calculated as market value of equity divided by book 
value of equity. Displayed as a percentage.
ROE Net income divided by book value of equity. Displayed as a percentage.
Sales The annual revenue a firm generates from the sale of its products.
E-index Proxy of corporate governance from Bebchuck et al. (2008). This form of the 
E-index is constructed using a point system based on whether firms have a 
staggered board, supermajority, poison pill, and/or golden parachute in place.
Appendix II: Acronyms
CSR Corporate social responsibility
CIC China Investment Corporation
ESG Environmental, social, and governance
GAPP Generally accepted principles and practices
GIC Government of Singapore Investment Corporation
AUM Assets under management
IWG The International Working Group
NGPF-G Norway Government Pension Fund-Global
NZSF New Zealand Superannuation Fund
APF Alaska Permanent Fund
AFF Australian Future Fund
KIC Korea Investment Corporation
TH Temasek Holdings
KIA Kuwait Investment Authority
HKMA Hong Kong Monetary Authority 
SRI Socially responsible investing (or sustainable, responsible and impact 
investing)
PSF (Texas) Permanent School Fund
PIC Public investment corporation
SWF Sovereign wealth fund
Appendix III: Asset4 subcomponent score definitions
Asset4 
(Datastream 






The shareholders/shareholder rights category measures 
a company’s management commitment and effectiveness 
towards following best practice corporate governance 
principles related to a shareholder policy and equal 
treatment of shareholders. It reflects a company’s capacity 
to be attractive to minority shareholders by ensuring them 








/oxrep/article/36/2/380/5813055 by guest on 16 M
arch 2021






The integration/vision and strategy category measures a 
company’s management commitment and effectiveness 
towards the creation of an overarching vision and strategy 
integrating financial and extra-financial aspects. It reflects a 
company’s capacity to convincingly show and communicate 
that it integrates the economic (financial), social, and 








The board of directors/compensation policy category 
measures a company’s management commitment and 
effectiveness towards following best-practice corporate 
governance principles related to competitive and 
proportionate management compensation. It reflects a 
company’s capacity to attract and retain executives and 
board members with the necessary skills by linking their 







The board of directors/board structure category measures 
a company’s management commitment and effectiveness 
towards following best-practice corporate governance 
principles related to a well balanced membership of the 
board. It reflects a company’s capacity to ensure a critical 
exchange of ideas and an independent decision-making 







The board of directors/board functions category measures 
a company’s management commitment and effectiveness 
towards following best-practice corporate governance 
principles related to board activities and functions. It 
reflects a company’s capacity to have an effective board 
by setting up the essential board committees with allocated 
tasks and responsibilities.
SOPR Social Customer /
product 
responsibility
The customer/product responsibility category 
measures a company’s management commitment and 
effectiveness towards creating value-added products and 
services upholding the customer’s security. It reflects 
a company’s capacity to maintain its licence to operate 
by producing quality goods and services integrating the 
customer’s health and safety, and preserving its integrity 
and privacy also through accurate product information 
and labelling.
SOCO Social Society /
community
The society/community category measures a company’s 
management commitment and effectiveness towards 
maintaining the company’s reputation within the general 
community (local, national, and global). It reflects a 
company’s capacity to maintain its licence to operate by 
being a good citizen (donations of cash, goods, or staff 
time, etc.), protecting public health (avoidance of industrial 
accidents, etc.) and respecting business ethics (avoiding 
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SOHR Social Society /
human rights
The society/human rights category measures a company’s 
management commitment and effectiveness towards 
respecting the fundamental human rights conventions. 
It reflects a company’s capacity to maintain its licence to 
operate by guaranteeing the freedom of association and 
excluding child, forced, or compulsory labour.
SODO Social Workforce /
diversity and 
opportunity
The workforce/diversity and opportunity category measures 
a company’s management commitment and effectiveness 
towards maintaining diversity and equal opportunities in its 
workforce. It reflects a company’s capacity to increase its 
workforce loyalty and productivity by promoting an effective 
life–work balance, a family friendly environment, and equal 
opportunities regardless of gender, age, ethnicity, religion, 
or sexual orientation.
SOEQ Social Workforce /
employment 
quality
The workforce/employment quality category measures a 
company’s management commitment and effectiveness 
towards providing high-quality employment benefits and job 
conditions. It reflects a company’s capacity to increase its 
workforce loyalty and productivity by distributing rewarding 
and fair employment benefits, and by focusing on long-term 
employment growth and stability by promoting from within, 
avoiding lay-offs, and maintaining relations with trade 
unions.
SOTD Social Workforce /
training and 
development
The workforce/training and development category 
measures a company’s management commitment and 
effectiveness towards providing training and development 
(education) for its workforce. It reflects a company’s 
capacity to increase its intellectual capital, workforce 
loyalty, and productivity by developing the workforce’s 
skills, competences, employability, and careers in an 
entrepreneurial environment.
SOHS Social Workforce /
health and 
safety
The workforce/health and safety category measures a 
company’s management commitment and effectiveness 
towards providing a healthy and safe workplace. It reflects 
a company’s capacity to increase its workforce loyalty and 
productivity by integrating into its day-to-day operations a 
concern for the physical and mental health, well-being, and 
stress level of all employees.
ENER Environmental Emission 
reduction
The emission reduction category measures a company’s 
management commitment and effectiveness towards 
reducing environmental emission in the production and 
operational processes. It reflects a company’s capacity 
to reduce air emissions (greenhouse gases, F-gases, 
ozone-depleting substances, NOx and SOx, etc.), 
waste, hazardous waste, water discharges, spills, or its 
impacts on biodiversity, and to partner with environmental 
organizations to reduce the environmental impact of the 
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ENPI Environmental Product 
innovation
The product innovation category measures a company’s 
management commitment and effectiveness towards 
supporting the research and development of eco-efficient 
products or services. It reflects a company’s capacity 
to reduce the environmental costs and burdens for its 
customers, and thereby creating new market opportunities 
through new environmental technologies and processes 
or eco-designed, dematerialized products with extended 
durability.
ENRR Environmental Resource 
reduction
The resource reduction category measures a company’s 
management commitment and effectiveness towards 
achieving an efficient use of natural resources in the 
production process. It reflects a company’s capacity to 
reduce the use of materials, energy, or water, and to find 
more eco-efficient solutions by improving supply chain 
management.
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